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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Unless there is some compelling need for this area of incompetency
supported by stronger reasons than those given for the common-law
rule,34 it should be eliminated from the statute books. A reason pre-
sented by the court is to avoid "fraud and collusion."35 This was one
of the reasons noted for the common-law rule which has been discarded
for all other cases except this and divorce proceedings, and there is no
more danger of collusion here than in other cases. Actually there is
less danger considering the delicacy of the testimony, which no one
is prone to divulge even if true, ". . . and the interest of the state in
the marriage relation, which may justify extreme measures to prevent
collusion in divorce litigation is no excuse for a rule of incompetency
in criminal conversation actions."3 6 In fact one jurisdiction, in a case
of criminal conversation presented at a time when the wife was gen-
erally incompetent as a witness for or against her husband, has held
that a wife should be allowed to testify for the husband in this action
on grounds of public policy.37 At a time when speedy and accurate
administration of justice has become the watchword, this change is in
order.
R. W. BRADLEY, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-State Statutes Enlarging Federal Equity
Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of Equitable Remedial Rights
Solely on a basis of diversity of citizenship a simple contract creditor
entered a federal court in Wisconsin and asked for a receiver. By prin-
ciples of old English Chancery as applied by the federal courts the plain-
tiff would not have been entitled to such relief until it had exhausted
its remedies at law. On the other hand, under the Wisconsin "Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act" the plaintiff was entitled to the relief.1
Held: Defendant's motion to dismiss denied.2
Under a similar set of facts in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen the
United States Supreme Court reversed an order appointing a receiver
Powell v. Strickland, 163 N. C. 393, 400, 79 S. E. 872, 875 (1913)
... whether it was upon the ground of interest alone, when the testimony is in
favor of the spouse, or marital bias, or public policy when it is against, or whether
it was because they were considered as two souls in a single body....").
"See note 31 supra.
" STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §58 n. 42 (1946).
" Coy v. Humphries, 142 Mo. App. 92, - , 125 S. W. 877, 879 (1910) ("All
power should be given to society to punish those moral ulcers on the body politic
which corrupt its vitals and demoralize its members; and unless society shall
apply sufficient remedies to repress the erotic mania displayed in this case [defend-
ant enticed a wife into adultery] its most cherished and priceless institutions-
home and the family-will be destroyed. The admission of testimony of the wife
for the plaintiff was not error.").
'WIs. STAT. (Brossard, 1943) §242.10.
'Houseware Sales Corp. v. Quaker Stretcher Co., 70 F. Supp. 747 (E. D.
Wis. 1947).
'261 U. S. 491 (1923). See Comment, 33 YALE L. J. 193 (1923).
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for want of equity jurisdiction.4 The opinion in that case restated the
doctrine of equitable remedial rights, to wit, that a remedial right to
proceed in a federal court sitting in equity can be neither enlarged
nor narrowed6 by state law.7
In the instant case, Judge Duffy, with remarkable candor, faced the
issue of whether the doctrine of equitable remedial rights in the Pusey
case is still the law after Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.8 Although he recog-
nized that the opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York9 did not expressly
over rule Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen, Judge Duffy concluded: The
"attitude of the Supreme Court" appears to be "that as far as possible
in shaping relief federal courts should conform to the laws of the State
where suit is brought in a diversity of citizenship case."'1
Soon after the formulation" of the doctrine of equitable remedial
rights the Supreme Court created a mode of circumventing that doctrine
-where desirable to reach a particular result. The Court laid down the
rule that although the states may neither enlarge nor narrow equitable
remedial rights in federal courts, the states may confer equitable sub-
stantive rights which will be administered in the federal courts.12  A
'Jurisdiction is not used in the strict sense of power to hear and determine
but rather in the sense of propriety or appropriateness according to established
principles of equity; see Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377 (1941) ;
Di Giovanni v. Camden Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64 (1935); Gordon v. Washington,
295 U. S. 30 (1935) ; Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208 (1926) ;
Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923) ; In re Metropolitan
Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 90 (1908). But see Atlas Ins. Co. v. Southern
Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 568 (1939) ; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451 (1893) ; In re
Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1887).
'Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377 (1941) ; Pusey & Jones v.
Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923); accord, Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County,
281 U. S. 121 (1930) ; see See & Depew v. Fisheries Products Co., 9 F. 2d 235
(C. C. A. 2d 1925) (a case involving N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §55-147).
1 Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101 (1914) ; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S.
202 (1893); accord, David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club, 225 U. S. 489
(1911) (action at law); Mason v. U. S., 260 U. S. 545 (1922).
S ee Cowley v. Northern Pacific R. R., 159 U. S. 569 (1895); Gormley v.
Clark, 134 U. S. 338 (1890); Kohler v. McClellan, 156 F. 2d 908 (C. C. A. 5th
1946) ; Orth v. Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F. 2d 938 (C. C. A. 3d 1942) ; Tower Hill-
Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F. 2d 817 (C. C. A. 4th 1933);
Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Fiscal Fund, 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Dela.
1943). See also Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, 55 YALE L. J.
401 (1946).
8304 U. S. 64 (1938).
p326 U. S. 99 (1945).
SHouseware Sales Corp. v. Quaker Stretcher Co., 70 F. Supp. 747, 750
(E. D. Wis. 1947) ; accord, Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 155 F. 2d 773 (C. C. A.
3d 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 621 (1947) ; Bruun v. Hanson, 103 F. 2d. 685
(C. C. A. 9th 1939). Contra: Pittsburgh Equitable Meter v. Loeber & Co., 160
F. 2d 721 CC. C. A. 7th 1947) (same circuit as instant case) ; see Kohler v.
McClelland, 156 F. 2d 908 (C. C. A. 5th 1946).
" Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818) ; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet.
647, 658 (U. S. 1832) ; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430 (U. S. 1868).
2 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932) ; Guardian Savings & Trust Co.
v. Road Improvement District, 267 U. S. 1 (1925); Lawson v. U. S. Mining Co:,
207 U. S. 1 (1907); Bardon v. Land & River Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327 (1895);
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nice distinction is required to determine when a state law merely confers
equitable remedial rights and when it confers equitable substantive rights.
From the deceptive and ambiguous meanings of the term, equitable
remedial rights, confusion has abounded. However, some idea of its
meaning is prerequisite to distinguishing equitable remedial rights from
equitable substantive rights. The term has not had the exclusive mean-
ing of referring to types of relief, e.g., specific performance, appoint-
ment of receiver, injunction. If that were its sole meaning, the distinc-
tion of equitable remedial rights from equitable substantive rights would
be relatively clear. Sometimes the term, equitable remedial rights, has
been used in the sense of the procedure in courts of chancery. 13 If that
were the extent of its meaning, the distinction would be the same as the
general distinction between "substance" and "procedure" which is nec-
essary in all civil actions of federal diversity jurisdiction.14  However,
in most cases the term, equitable remedial rights, denoted the elements
of a suit required to justify giving the desired equitable relief. For
example, in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen the statute, which was construed
as merely conferring an equitable remedial right, abolished the principle
of old English Chancery which made an execution returned unsatisfied
an element prerequisite to the appointment of a receiver. In this respect
."equitable remedial rights" has been used synonymously with "principles
of equity" or "rules of decision." Indeed some opinions have thus
phrased the doctrine of equitable remedial rights: "Remedies afforded
• . . in Federal [equity] courts are not determined by local laws or
rules of decisions, but by general principles, rules and usages of equity
having uniform operation in [Federal] courts wherever sitting."' 5
The purported distinction between equitable remedial rights in the
sense of principles of equity and equitable substantive rights has been
at best wholly unpredictable.' 0 However, where a state statute concerned
the title of real property, the Court has consistently construed such
Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338 (1890) (The Court said that in diversity of
citizenship cases' it would administer the equitable relief which state legislation
accords.) ; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 (1883) (enlargements of rights will
be administered, "though in the form of remedial proceedings") ; Case of Brod-
erick's Will, 21 Wall. 503 (U. S. 1874); Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 194 (U. S.
1839).Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818).
14 Clark, Procedural Aspects of the New State Independence, 8 GEO. WAsH. L.
R-v. 1230 (1940); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REy. 271 (1939).
" Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 114 (1914); see also Livingston v. Story,
9 Pet. 632 (U. S. 1835) ; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 648, 658 (U. S. 1832) ; United
States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 115 (U. S. 1819).
" For a suggested test, see Comment, 33 YALE L. J. 193, 195 (1923) "A statute
which allows a suit in equity to accomplish a result which could be attained by an
action at law gives a remedial right.. . .A statute which allows a suit in equity
to accomplish a result which, except for the statute, could not be attained either
at law or equity . . . gives an equitable substantive remedial right."
1948]
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statutes to create equitable substantive rights because reasons of policy
demanded uniformity within the statelT--a marked parallel to the ex-
ception to the Swift v. Tyson'8 rule.
The doctrine of equitable remedial rights emanated from a fear of
the hostile attitude of some states to courts of chancery and a desire for
national uniformity in equity'0 analogous to the Swift v. Tyson doctrine
at law. The doctrine served a valuable function when the federal equity
courts were in their infancy, but it belongs to the climate of juris-
prudential opinion of Swift v. Tyson.
Swift v. Tyson was overruled in 1938. The policy of Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins"0 was immediately extended to suits in equity.2 ' In Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "To make an exception
to Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins on the equity side of a federal court is
to reject the considerations of policy which, after long travail, led to
that decision."1
22
Nevertheless, the decisions of the Supreme Court since 1938 do not
inevitably command agreement with Judge Duffy's conclusion in the
instant case that ihe doctrine of equitable remedial rights in the Pusey
case is no longer the law in diversity jurisdiction cases. 28 In Kelleam
v. Maryland Casualty Co.2 4 the Supreme Court squarely upheld the doc-
trine of equitable remedial rights in a diversity jurisdiction case. How-
ever, the force of this decision is weakened to some extent because:
(1) the Court did not mention Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, and (2) the
decision could have been made purely on a basis of affording comity to
the Oklahoma probate court.
25
7Lawson v. U. S. Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1 (1907) ; Bardon v. Land & River
Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327 (1895); Reynolds v. Crawfordville Bank, 112 U. S. 405
(1884); Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 (1883); Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 194
(U. S. 1839) (federal courts will "give effect to state legislation and policy").
But cf. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 (1891).
28 16 Pet. 1, 18 (U. S. 1842). Under the Swift v. Tyson rule, "when such rules
of property concerning real property have been declared by lines of decisions in
the state courts, then federal courts will consider themselves bound by these
decisions," DoBE oN FEDERAL PROCEDURE §143 (1928).
"- Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818); Guffey v. Smith, 237
U. S. 101 (1914); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202 (1893); Payne v.
Hook, 7 Wall, 425 (U. S. 1868) ; Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632 (U. S. 1835) ;
Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 648, 658 (U. S. 1832); United States v. Howland, 4
Wheat. 115 (U. S. 1819); Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogony Ass'n, Inc., 129 F.
2d 227 (C. C. A. 3d 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 672 (1942). See von Mosch-
zisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 287 (1927).
20304 U. S. 64 (1938).
21 Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938).
22326 U. S. 99, 111 (1945).23E.g., Atlas Ins. Co. v. Southern Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 568 (1939); Sprague
v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 164 (1939) (this was not a case of
federal diversity jurisdiction, but its dictum approving the doctrine of equitable
remedial rights has been transplanted by lower courts into cases of diversity juris-
diction) ; decisions in lower federal courts, collected in Comment, 55 YALE L. J.
401, n. 10 (1946).
2-312 U. S. 377 (1941); criticised, 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PaAcncE 114 (Supp.
1946).
^' Note, 50 YALE: L. J. 1094 (1941).
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The Supreme Court had an opportunity to abolish the doctrine of
equitable remedial rights in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 26 because the
court of appeals had expressly stated: "[Erie R. R. v. Tompkins] did
not in any way alter the wholly distinct doctrine, relating to equitable
'remedial rights.' ,27 However, the Supreme Court did two apparently
inconsistent things. First, it reversed the lower court's decision and laid
down the standard that state law will control in cases of federal diversity
jurisdiction whenever it significantly affects the outcome of the litigation.
Then, secondly, the Court proceeded to utter some dictum apparently
approving the doctrine of equitable remedial rights. The most note-
worthy and unfortunate dictum was: "State law cannot define the
remedies which a federal court must give simply because a federal court
in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal to the
State's courts.
'28
In the instant case, if these obiter remarks are ignored and if the
standard set forth in the Guaranty Trust case is applied, it is obvious
that the, outcome of the suit will be significantly affected by following
the Wisconsin statute, which makes an execution returned unsatisfied
unnecessary to the appointment of a receiver, instead of following the
contrary principle of old English Chancery.29
The reasoning in favor of following the Wisconsin statute would
be even stronger if a simple contract creditor had instituted his suit for
a receiver in a Wisconsin state court and a non-resident defendant had
removed the suit to a federal court. Under such circumstances, could
the over-all policy of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins condone the defendant's
invoking the doctrine of equitable remedial rights to nullify the plain-
tiff's right to a receiver under the Wisconsin statute ?3
After the instant case was decided, the Supreme Court in Angel v.
Bullington31 reached a result 32 whereby the federal court in a: diversity
jurisdiction case was bound by a North Carolina statute83 withdrawing
from the North Carolina courts jurisdiction to grant deficiency judg-
ments. Inter alia, the court said: "Cases like David Luptores Sons v.
26 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
" York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. 2d 503, 522 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
"
8Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 106 (1945).29 In Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 221 (U. S. 1872) Mr. Justice Swayne said:
"A party by going into a National Court does not lose any right or appropriate
remedy of which he might have availed himself in the State courts of the same
locality." In Puisey & Jones v. Hanssen the Court said the foregoing "oft-quoted
statement ...must be taken with the qualification [of the doctrine of equitable
remedial rights]." Today, is this qualification valid?
"' Cowley v. Northern Pacific R. R., 159 U. S. 569 (1895). Although this case
was decided long before the Erie case the court said: "It does not lie in his
[defendant's] mouth to claim such [federal] court has no jurisdiction."
= -- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 557 (1947).
32 See Farinholt, Angel v. Bullngton: Twilight of Diversity Jurisdiction, 26
N. C. L. REv. 29 (1947) ; Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 60 (1947).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-36.
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Automobile Club 4 are obsolete. '85  The Lupton case had often been
cited for the proposition that state laws cannot enlarge or restrict fed-
eral jurisdiction. The Lupton case is distinguished from the instant
case because it was an action at law and also the statute in that case
attempted to restrict federal jurisdiction rather than to enlarge it.
The distinction between statutes which are construed to restrict fed-
eral equity jurisdiction and statutes which are urged to enlarge federal
equity jurisdiction may be decisive.3 6 The importance of the distinction
would be quite logical, if the Supreme Court should interpret federal
equity jurisdiction in the sense of power to hear and determine rather
than in the sense of propriety.37 Under such an interpretation, the
Court could consider it within its discretion to withhold a portion of its
federal equity pover in order to give effect to a state statute restricting
equity jurisdiction. At the same time, the Court could consider it beyond
its power to follow a state statute attempting to enlarge the reservoir
of federal equity jurisdiction which Congress has conferred.38
Consequently, whether the .language of the majority opinion in
Angel v. Bullington, "cases like the Lupton case are obsolete," was in-
tended to include suits of an equitable nature such as the instant case
where the state law attempts to enlarge equitable remedial rights is not
certain. The dissent seemed to think it did, because the dissent, citing
Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen and other cases espousing the doctrine of
equitable remedial rights, said: "The majority departs from controlling
precedents that state'enactments on jurisdiction, remedies and procedures
do not affect the jurisdiction, remedies and procedures of federal
courts." 39 It is hoped that the dissent's interpretation of the majority's
opinion is correct and that the obsolete doctrine of equitable remedial
rights has been abolished. However, it must be borne in mind that,
although the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision in the
Guaranty Trust case, it has never specifically overruled the statement
34225 U. S. 489 (1911).
"Angel v. Bullington, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 662, 91 L. Ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 557 (1947).
'sThe history of the doctrine of equitable remedial rights shows that the
Supreme Court has been more favorably disposed to enforce statutory enlarge-
ments than statutory limitations because of a fear that the state might usurp fed-
eral equity, Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818); 1 POmER oY, EQuIr
JURISPRUDEN cE §292 (5th ed. Symons 1941). Today, "there is strong sentiment
in favor of entirely omitting cases based on diverse citizenship," MONTGOMERY'S
MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE §4" (4th ed. 1942). Federal
diversity jurisdiction may be judicially minimized by always affording the same
result in the federal court as would have been obtained in the state court by fol-
lowing the state law.
'7 See note 4 supra.
"1 STAT. 78 (1789), 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1927). See Atlas Ins. Co. v South-
ern Inc.. 306 U. S. 563, 568 (1939).
" 67- Sup. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 557 (1947). But see Pittsburgh
Equitable Meter Co. v. Loeber & Co., 160 F. 2d 721 (C. C. A. 7th 1947) (decided
after the Bullington case and in the same circuit as the instant case).
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in the lower court's.opinion: "[Erie R. R. v: Tompkins] did not in any
way alter the wholly distinct doctrine relating to equitable remedial
rights.... There is no doubt that today, as before Erie R. R. Co. v.
Tompkins, a federal court sitting in a given state will, for instance,
refuse to appoint a receiver at the suit of an -unsecured creditor although
the statute of that state authorizes such an action." 40
In any event, even if the doctrine of equitable remedial rights has
been abolished, the litigant in a federal diversity jurisdiction case must
still resolve the general dilemma of "substance" and "procedure."
HENRY E. COLTON.
Habeas Corpus-A Method of Federal Review of State Decisions?
There has been an increasing number of applications for writs of
habeas corpus in the federal courts -to review the administration of
justice by the state courts. Such applications present a complex prob-
lem to the federal judge. He is torn between the traditional reluctance
of the federal courts to interfere with the states' administration of jus-
tice and the urgent desire to assure an accused of a fair trial.
In Stonebreaker v. Smyth,' recently decided by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals; the problem was aptly illustrated. The appellant,
Stonebreaker, was serving a sentence of fifty years in the Virginia
State Penitentiary, imposed by a Virginia court in 1931 upon pleas of
guilty to three indictments charging armed robbery. In 1943, Stone-
breaker had presented his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the trial
court, alleging that he had been denied due process of law guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, in that, at
the time he was sentenced he was a minor twenty years of, age, ignorant
and uinformed as to his right to counsel, and incapable of representing
himself, and that he had pleaded guilty because of a confession that
had. been unfairly obtained from him. After full hearing on the merits,
the trial court discharged the writ and dismissed the petition; and a writ
of error was denied by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Then, in 1944, an application for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied.2
After more than two years, the petitioner filed his petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, relying on the identical grounds urged in the state
court in 1943. The district court, relying on White v. Ragen,3 dismissed
the petition without an examination into the substance of the allegations,
,York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. 2d 503, 522 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
163 F. 2d 498 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
2 Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 323 U. S. 754 (1944).
324 U. S. 760 (1944).
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